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Simple Summary: The twentieth century has witnessed a bewildering array of ethical 
revolutions, from civil rights to environmentalism to feminism. Often ignored is the rise of 
massive societal concern across the world regarding animal treatment. Regulation of 
animal research exists in virtually all western countries, and reform of “factory farming” is 
regnant in Europe and rapidly emerging in the United States. Opponents of concern for 
animals often dismiss the phenomenon as rooted in emotion and extremist lack of 
appreciation of how unrestricted animal use has improved human life. Such a view totally 
ignores the rational ethical basis for elevating legal protection for animals, as explained in 
this essay. 
Abstract: Businesses and professions must stay in accord with social ethics, or risk losing 
their autonomy.A major social ethical issue that has emerged in the past four decades is the 
treatment of animals in various areas of human use. Society’s moral concern has outgrown 
the traditional ethic of animal cruelty that began in biblical times and is encoded in the 
laws of all civilized societies. There are five major reasons for this new social concern, 
most importantly, the replacement of husbandry-based agriculture with industrial 
agriculture. This loss of husbandry to industry has threatened the traditional fair contract 
between humans and animals, and resulted in significant amounts of animal suffering 
arising on four different fronts. Because such suffering is not occasioned by cruelty, a new 
ethic for animals was required to express social concerns. Since ethics proceed from 
preexisting ethics rather than ex nihilo, society has looked to its ethic for humans, 
appropriately modified, to find moral categories applicable to animals. This concept of 
legally encoded rights for animals has emerged as a plausible vehicle for reform. 
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The last 50 years have witnessed a dazzling array of social ethical revolutions in Western society. 
Such moral movements as feminism, civil rights, environmentalism, affirmative action, consumer 
advocacy, pro- and anti-abortion activism, homosexual rights, children’s rights, the student movement, 
antiwar activism, public rejection of biotechnology, have forever changed the way governments and 
public institutions comport themselves. This is equally true for private enterprise: to be successful, 
businesses must be seen as operating solidly in harmony with changing and emerging social ethics. It 
is arguable that morally based boycotting of South African business was instrumental in bringing about 
the end of apartheid, and similar boycotting of some farm products in the U.S. led to significant 
improvements in the living situations of farm workers. It is de rigeur for major corporations to have 
reasonable numbers of minorities visibly peopling their ranks, and for liquor companies to advertise on 
behalf of moderation in alcohol consumption. Cigarette companies now press upon the public a 
message that cigarettes kill, and extol their involvement in protecting battered women; and forestry and 
oil companies spend millions (even billions) to persuade the public of their environmental 
commitments. CNN reported that “green” investment funds grew significantly faster than ordinary 
funds, and reports of child labor or sweatshop working conditions can literally destroy product markets 
overnight. 
Not only is success tied to accord with social ethics but, even more fundamentally, freedom and 
autonomy are as well. Every profession—be it medicine, law or agriculture—is given freedom by the 
social ethic to pursue its aims. In return, society basically says to professions it does not understand 
well enough to regulate, “you regulate yourselves the way we would regulate you if we understood 
what you do, which we don’t. But we will know if you don’t self-regulate properly and then we will 
regulate you, despite our lack of understanding.” For example, some years ago, Congress became 
concerned about excessive use of antibiotic in animal feeds, and concluded that veterinarians were a 
major source of the problem. As a result, Congress was about to ban extra-label drug use by 
veterinarians, a move that would have killed veterinary medicine as we know it. However, through 
extensive efforts to educate legislators, such legislation did not proceed to law. 
One major social ethical concern that has developed over the last four decades is a significant 
emphasis on the treatment of animals used by society for various purposes. It is easy to demonstrate 
the degree to which these concerns have seized the public imagination. According to both the U.S. 
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association and the National Institutes of Health (the latter being the source 
of funding for the majority of biomedical research in the U.S.), both groups not inclined to exaggerate 
the influence of animal ethics, by the early 1990s Congress had been consistently receiving more 
letters, phone calls, faxes, e-mails and personal contacts on animal-related issues than on any other 
topic [1,2]. 
Whereas 30 years ago one would have found no bills pending in the U.S. Congress relating to 
animal welfare, recent years have witnessed dozens of such bills annually, with even more 
proliferating at the state level, as we shall explain in detail. The federal bills have ranged from attempts 
to prevent duplication in animal research, to saving marine mammals from becoming victims of tuna 
fishermen, to preventing importation of ivory, to curtailing the parrot trade. State laws passed in large 
numbers have increasingly prevented the use of live or dead shelter animals for biomedical research 
and training and have focused on myriad other areas of animal welfare. Eight states have abolished the 
steel-jawed leghold trap, as have some 90 countries [3]. When Colorado’s politically appointed 




Wildlife Commission failed to act on a recommendation from the Division of Wildlife to abolish the 
spring bear hunt (because hunters were liable to shoot lactating mothers, leaving their orphaned cubs to 
die of starvation), the general public ended the hunt through a popular referendum. Seventy percent of 
Colorado’s population voted for this as a constitutional amendment [4]. In Ontario, the environmental 
minister stopped a similar hunt by executive fiat in response to social ethical concern [5]. California 
abolished the hunting of mountain lions, and state fishery management agencies have been taking a 
hard look at catch-and-release programs on humane grounds [6]. 
In fact, wildlife managers have worried, in academic journals, about “management by referendum” 
for humane reasons. According to the director of the American Quarter Horse Association, the number 
of state bills related to horse welfare filled a telephone-book-sized volume in 1998 alone [7]. Public 
sentiment for equine welfare in California carried a bill through the state legislature making the 
slaughter of horses or shipping of horses for slaughter a felony in that state and the end of horse 
slaughter in the U.S. followed. Municipalities have passed ordinances ranging from the abolition of 
rodeos, circuses, and zoos to the protection of prairie dogs and, in the case of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts (a biomedical Mecca), the strictest laws in the world regulating research. 
Even more dramatic, perhaps, is the worldwide proliferation of laws to protect laboratory animals. 
In the United States, for example, two major pieces of legislation, which I helped draft and defend 
before Congress, regulating and constraining the use and treatment of animals in research were passed 
by the U.S. Congress in 1985, despite vigorous opposition from the powerful biomedical research and 
medical lobbies. This opposition included well-financed, highly visible advertisements and media 
promotions indicating that human health and medical progress would be harmed by implementation of 
such legislation. There was even a less than subtle film titled “Will I Be All Right, Doctor?” the query 
coming from a sick child, the response coming from a pediatrician who affirmed, in essence, “You will 
be if ‘they’ leave us alone to do as we wish with animals.” With social concern for laboratory animals 
unmitigated by such threats, research animal protection laws moved easily through Congress and have 
been implemented at considerable cost to taxpayers. When I testified before Congress on behalf of this 
law in 1982, a literature search in the Library of Congress turned up no papers in the scientific 
literature on laboratory animal analgesia and only two on animal analgesia, one of which said "there 
ought to be papers." Now there are over 11,000.  
In 1986, Britain superseded its pioneering act of 1876 with new laws aimed at strengthening public 
confidence in the welfare of experimental animals [8]. Many other countries have moved or are 
moving in a similar direction, despite the fact that some 90% of laboratory animals are rats and mice, not 
the most cuddly and lovable of animals. Research on Great Apes has been truncated across the world.  
Many animal uses seen as frivolous by the public have been abolished without legislation. 
Toxicological testing of cosmetics on animals has been truncated; companies such as the Body Shop 
have been wildly successful internationally by totally disavowing such testing, and free-range egg 
production is a growth industry across the Western world. Greyhound racing in the U.S. has declined, 
in part for animal welfare reasons, with the Indiana veterinary community spearheading the effort to 
prevent greyhound racing from coming into the state. Zoos that are little more than prisons for animals 
(the state of the art during my youth) have all but disappeared, and the very existence of zoos is being 
increasingly challenged, despite the public’s unabashed love of seeing animals. And, as Gaskell and 
his associates’ work has revealed [9], genetic engineering has been rejected in Europe not, as 




commonly believed, for reasons of risk but for reasons of ethics; in part for reasons of animal ethics. 
Similar reasons (i.e., fear of harming cattle) have, in part, driven European rejection of bovine 
somatotropin (BST). Rodeos such as the Houston Livestock Show have, in essence, banned jerking of 
calves in roping, despite opposition from the Professional Rodeo Cowboys Association, who 
themselves never show the actual roping of a calf on national television. 
Inevitably, agriculture has felt the force of social concern with animal treatment—indeed, it is 
arguable that contemporary concern in society with the treatment of farm animals in modern 
production systems blazed the trail leading to a new ethic for animals. As early as 1965, British society 
took notice of what the public saw as an alarming tendency to industrialize animal agriculture by 
chartering the Brambell Commission, a group of scientists under the leadership of Sir Rogers 
Brambell, who affirmed that any agricultural system failing to meet the needs and natures of animals 
was morally unacceptable [10]. Though the Brambell Commission recommendations enjoyed no 
regulatory status, they served as a moral lighthouse for European social thought. In 1988, the Swedish 
Parliament passed, virtually unopposed, what the New York Times call a “Bill of Rights” for farm 
animals, abolishing in Sweden, in a series of timed steps, the confinement systems currently 
dominating North American agriculture [11]. Much of northern Europe has followed suit, and the 
European Union is moving in a similar direction, and sow stalls must be eliminated in by 2011 [12].  
Although the U.S. has been a latecomer to agricultural issues, things have moved rapidly, with 
referenda pressed by HSUS abolishing sow stalls, battery cages, and veal crates across the U.S. My 
own work attests to this tendency. In 2007, over two days of dialogue, I convinced Smithfield Farms, 
the world's largest pork producer, to phase out gestation crates. In 2008, the Pew Commission, on 
which I served as the advocate for farm animal welfare, called for the end of high confinement animal 
agriculture within ten years, for reasons of animal welfare, environmental despoliation, human and 
animal health, and social justice. Most dramatically, I was able to broker an agreement between the 
Humane Society of the United States and the Colorado Livestock Association passing a jointly 
sponsored farm animal welfare law in Colorado in 2008, abolishing sow stalls and veal crates. 
The agriculture community in the U.S. has been far behind societal concern. There is one 
monumental conceptual error that is omnipresent in the agricultural industry’s discussions of animal 
welfare—an error of such magnitude that it trivializes the industry’s responses to ever-increasing 
societal concerns about the treatment of agricultural animals. When one discusses farm animal welfare 
with industry groups or with the American Veterinary Medical Association, one finds the same 
response—animal welfare is solely a matter of “sound science”. 
Those of us serving on the Pew Commission, better known as the National Commission on 
Industrial Farm Animal Production, encountered this response regularly during our dealings with 
industry representatives. This commission studied intensive animal agriculture in the U.S. [13]. For 
example, one representative of the Pork Producers, testifying before the Commission, answered that 
while people in her industry were quite “nervous” about the Commission, their anxiety would be 
allayed were we to base all of our conclusions and recommendations on “sound science”. Hoping to 
rectify the error in that comment, as well as educate the numerous industry representatives present, I 
responded to her as follows: “Madame, if we on the Commission were asking the question of how to 
raise swine in confinement, science could certainly answer that question for us. But that is not the 
question the Commission, or society, is asking. What we are asking is, ought we raise swine in 




confinement? And to this question, science is not relevant”. Judging by her “huh”, I assume I did not 
make my point. 
Questions of animal welfare are at least partly “ought” questions, questions of ethical obligation. 
The concept of animal welfare is an ethical concept to which, once understood, science brings relevant 
data. When we ask about an animal’s welfare, or about a person’s welfare, we are asking about what 
we owe the animal, and to what extent. A document called the CAST report, first published by U.S. 
Agricultural scientists in the early 1980’s, discussed animal welfare, it affirmed that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for attributing positive welfare to an animal were represented by the animals’ 
productivity. A productive animal enjoyed positive welfare; a non-productive animal enjoyed poor 
welfare [14]. 
This notion was fraught with many difficulties. First of all, productivity is an economic notion 
predicated of a whole operation; welfare is predicated of individual animals. An operation, such as 
caged laying hens may be quite profitable if the cages are severely over-crowded, yet the individual 
hens do not enjoy good welfare. Second, as we shall see, equating productivity and welfare is, to some 
significant extent, legitimate under husbandry conditions, where the producer does well if and only if 
the animals do well, and square pegs, as it were, are fitted into square holes with as little friction as 
possible (as when pigs live outside). Under industrial conditions, however, animals do not naturally fit 
in the niche or environment in which they are kept, and are subjected to “technological sanders” that 
allow for producers to force square pegs into round holes—antibiotics, feed additives, hormones, air 
handling systems—so the animals do not die and produce more and more kilograms of meat or milk. 
Without these technologies, the animals could not be productive. We will return to the contrast 
between husbandry and industrial approaches to animal agriculture. 
The key point to recall here is that even if the CAST Report definition of animal welfare did not 
suffer from the difficulties we outlined, it is still an ethical concept. It essentially says “what we owe 
animals and to what extent is simply what it takes to get them to create profit”. This in turn would 
imply that the animals are well-off if they have only food, water, and shelter, something the industry 
has sometimes asserted. Even in the early 80’s, however, there were animal advocates and others who 
would take a very different ethical stance on what we owe farm animals. Indeed, the famous five 
freedoms articulated in Britain by the Farm Animal Welfare Council during the 1970’s (even before 
the CAST Report) represents quite a different ethical view of what we owe animals, when it affirms that:  
The welfare of an animal includes its physical and mental state and we consider that good 
animal welfare implies both fitness and a sense of well-being. Any animal kept by man, 
must at least, be protected from unnecessary suffering. 
We believe that an animal’s welfare, whether on farm, in transit, at market or at a place of 
slaughter should be considered in terms of ‘five freedoms’ (see www.fawc.org.uk): 
1. Freedom from Hunger and Thirst—by ready access to fresh water and a diet to 
maintain full health and vigor. 
2. Freedom from Discomfort—by providing an appropriate environment including 
shelter and a comfortable resting area. 
3. Freedom from Pain, Injury or Disease—by prevention or rapid diagnosis and 
treatment. 




4. Freedom to Express Normal Behavior—by providing sufficient space, proper 
facilities and company of the animal’s own kind. 
5. Freedom from Fear and Distress—by ensuring conditions and treatment which 
avoid mental suffering. 
Clearly, the two definitions contain very different notions of our moral obligation to animals (and 
there is an indefinite number of other definitions). Which is correct, of course, cannot be decided by 
gathering facts or doing experiments—indeed which ethical framework one adopts will in fact 
determine the shape of science studying animal welfare. 
To clarify: suppose you hold the view that an animal is well-off when it is productive, as per the 
CAST Report. The role of your welfare science in this case will be to study what feed, bedding, 
temperature, etc. are most efficient at producing the most meat, milk, or eggs for the least  
money—much what animal and veterinary science does today. On the other hand, if you take the 
FAWC view of welfare, your efficiency will be constrained by the need to acknowledge the animal’s 
natural behavior and mental state, and to assure that there is minimal pain, fear, distress and 
discomfort—not factors in the CAST view of welfare unless they have a negative impact on economic 
productivity. Thus, in a real sense, sound science does not determine your concept of welfare; rather, 
your concept of welfare determines what counts as sound science! 
The failure to recognize the inescapable ethical component in the concept of animal welfare leads 
inexorably to those holding different ethical views talking past each other. Thus, producers ignore 
questions of animal pain, fear, distress, confinement, truncated mobility, bad air quality, social 
isolation, and impoverished environment unless any of these factors impact negatively on the “bottom 
line”. Animal advocates, on the other hand, give such factors primacy, and are totally unimpressed 
with how efficient or productive the system may be. 
A major question obviously arises here. If the notion of animal welfare is inseparable from ethical 
components, and people’s ethical stance on obligations to farm animals differ markedly across a highly 
diverse spectrum, whose ethic is to predominate and define, in law or regulation, what counts as 
“animal welfare”? It is to this issue we now turn. 
What is the nature of the emerging new ethical thinking that underlies and informs the dramatic 
social changes just discussed? Although society has always had an articulated ethic regarding animal 
treatment, that ethic has been very minimalistic, leaving most of the issue of animal treatment to 
people’s personal ethic, rather than to the social ethic. Since Biblical times, that limited social ethic has 
forbidden deliberate, willful, sadistic, deviant, purposeless, unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering 
on animals, or outrageous neglect, such as not feeding or watering. Beginning in the early nineteenth 
century, this set of prohibitions was articulated in the anti-cruelty statutes of the laws in all civilized 
societies [15]. But even in Biblical and medieval times, the social ethic inveighed against cruelty. The 
Old Testament injunctions against yoking an ox and an ass together to a plow, or muzzling the ox 
when it is being used to mill grain, or seething a calf in its mother’s milk, all reflect concern with, and 
abhorrence for what the Rabbinical tradition called tsaar baalei chaiim; the suffering of living things. 
In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas [16], while affirming that, lacking a soul, animals enjoyed no 
moral status, nonetheless strictly forbade cruelty, on the grounds that permitting such behavior towards 
animals would encourage its spreading to human beings, an insight buttressed by over two decades of 




recent research [17]. Numerous serial killers have evidenced early abusive behavior towards animals, 
as have many of the youths in the U.S. who in recent years wrought massacres on their peers. 
For the overwhelming majority of human history, until some four decades ago, the anti-cruelty ethic 
served as the only socially articulated moral principle for animal treatment. Except for a few sporadic 
voices following in the wake of Darwin’s articulation of human-animal continuity, no one spoke of 
animals’ rights, nor did society have moral concepts for animal treatment that went “beyond cruelty.” 
The obvious question that presents itself is this: What has occurred during the last half century which 
led to social disaffection with the venerable ethic of anti-cruelty and to strengthening of the  
anti-cruelty laws, which now make cruelty a felony in almost 40 states. 
In a study commissioned by USDA to answer this question, I distinguished a variety of social and 
conceptual reasons [18]: 
(1) Changing demographics and consequent changes in the paradigm for animals: 
Whereas at the turn of the century, more than half the population was engaged in producing food for 
the rest, today only some 1.5% of the U.S. public is engaged in production agriculture[19]. One 
hundred years ago, if one were to ask a person in the street, urban or rural, to state the words that come 
into their mind when one says “animal”, the answer would doubtless have been “horse”, “cow”, 
“food”, “work”, etc. Today, however, for the majority of the population, the answer is “dog”, “cat”, 
“pet”. Repeated studies show that almost 100% of the pet-owning population views their animals as 
“members of the family” [20] and virtually no one views them as an income source. Divorce lawyers 
note that custody of the dog can be as thorny an issue as custody of the children! 
(2) We have lived through a long period of ethical soul-searching 
For almost 50 years society has turned its “ethical searchlight” on humans traditionally ignored  
or even oppressed by the consensus ethic—blacks, women, the handicapped, other minorities.  
The same ethical imperative has focused attention on our treatment of the non-human world—the 
environment and animals. Many leaders of the activist animal movement in fact have roots in earlier  
movements—civil rights, feminism, homosexual rights, children’s rights, labor. 
(3) The media has discovered that “animals sell papers” 
One cannot channel-surf across normal television service without being bombarded with animal 
stories, real and fictional. (A New York Times reporter recently told me that more time on cable TV in 
New York City is devoted to animals than to any other subject.) Recall, for example, the extensive 
media coverage a decade ago of some whales trapped in an ice-floe, and freed by a Russian  
ice-breaker. This was hardly an overflowing of Russian compassion—an oxymoronic notion applied to 
a people who gave us pogroms, the Gulag, and Stalinism. Rather, someone in the Kremlin was bright 
enough to realize that liberating the whales was an extremely cheap way to score points with U.S. 
public opinion. 
(4) Strong and visible arguments have been advanced in favor of raising the status of animals by 
philosophers, scientists and celebrities [21-26]. 
(5) Changes in the nature of animal use demanded new moral categories 
In my view, while all of the reasons listed above are relevant, they are nowhere nearly as important 
as the precipitous and dramatic changes in animal use that occurred after World War II. These changes 
were, first of all, huge conceptual changes in the nature of agriculture and second the rise of significant 
amounts of animal research and testing. 




For virtually all of human history, animal agriculture was based foursquare in animal husbandry. 
Husbandry, derived from the old Norse word “hus/band,” bonded to the household, meant taking great 
pains to put one’s animals into the best possible environment one could find to meet their physical and 
psychological natures which, following Aristotle, I call telos [23], and then augmenting their ability to 
survive and thrive by providing them with food during famine, protection from predation, water during 
drought, medical attention, help in birthing, and so on. Thus traditional agriculture was roughly a fair 
contract between humans and animals, with both sides being better off in virtue of the relationship. 
Husbandry agriculture was about putting square pegs into square holes, round pegs into round holes, 
and creating as little friction as possible doing so. So powerful is the notion of husbandry, in fact, that 
when the Psalmist seeks a metaphor for God’s ideal relationship to humans, he seizes upon the 
shepherd in the 23rd Psalm: 
The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want; He maketh me to lie down in green pastures; He 
leadeth me beside still waters; He restoreth my soul.  
We wish no more from God than what the husbandman provides for his sheep. In husbandry, a 
producer did well if and only if the animals did well, so productivity was tied to welfare. No social 
ethic was thus needed to ensure proper animal treatment; only the anti-cruelty designed to deal with 
sadists and psychopaths was needed to augment husbandry. Self-interest virtually assured good 
treatment. 
After World War II, this beautiful contract was broken by humans. Symbolically, at universities, 
Departments of Animal Husbandry became Departments of Animal Science, defined not as care, but as 
“the application of industrial methods to the production of animals” to increase efficiency and 
productivity. With “technological sanders”—hormones, vaccines, antibiotics, air-handling systems, 
mechanization—we could force square pegs into round holes, and place animals into environments 
where they suffered in ways irrelevant to productivity. If a nineteenth century agriculturalist had tried 
to put 100,000 egg-laying hens in cages in a building, they all would have died of disease in a month; 
today such systems dominate. 
The new approach to animal agriculture was not the result of cruelty, bad character or even 
insensitivity. It developed rather out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives that were a 
product of dramatic significant historical and social upheavals that occurred after World War II. At 
that point in time, agricultural scientists and government officials became extremely concerned about 
supplying the public with cheap and plentiful food for a variety of reasons. In the first place, after the 
Dust Bowl and the Great Depression, many people in the U.S. had soured on farming. Second, 
reasonable predictions of urban and suburban encroachment on agricultural land were being made, 
with a resultant diminution of land for food production. Third, many farm people had been sent to both 
foreign and domestic urban centers during the war, thereby creating a reluctance to return to rural areas 
that lacked excitement; recall the song of the 40’s “How are you gonna keep ‘em down on the farm 
now that they’ve seen Paree?” Fourth, having experienced the spectre of literal starvation during the 
Great Depression, the American consumer was, for the first time in history, fearful of an insufficient 
food supply. Fifth, projection of major population increases further fueled concern. 
When the above considerations of loss of land and diminution of agricultural labor are coupled with 
the rapid development of a variety of technological modalities relevant to agriculture during and after 




World War II and with the burgeoning belief in technologically-based economics of scale, it was 
probably inevitable that animal agriculture would become subject to industrialization. This was a major 
departure from traditional agriculture and a fundamental change in agricultural core values—industrial 
values of efficiency and productivity replaced and eclipsed the traditional values of “way of life” and 
husbandry. 
There is thus no question that industrialized agriculture, including animal agriculture, is responsible 
for greatly increased productivity. It is equally clear that the husbandry associated with traditional 
agriculture has changed significantly as a result of industrialization. One of my colleagues, a cow-calf 
cattle specialist, says that the worst thing that ever happened to his department is betokened by the 
name change from Animal Husbandry to Animal Science. No husbandry person would ever dream of 
feeding sheep meal, poultry waste, or cement dust to cattle, but such “innovations” are entailed by an 
industrial/efficiency mind-set. 
In addition, in the mid-twentieth century there arose large scale use of animals in research and 
testing for toxicity. This too was an unprecedented large-scale use of animals, lacking the fairness of 
husbandry agriculture.  
A moment’s reflection on the development of large-scale animal research and high-technology 
agriculture elucidates why these innovations have led to the demand for a new ethic for animals in 
society. In a nutshell, these new developments represent a radically different playing field of animal 
use from the one that characterized most of human history; in the modern world of agriculture and 
animal research, the traditional anti-cruelty ethic grows increasingly less applicable. A thought 
experiment makes this clear. Imagine a pie chart that represents all the suffering that animals 
experience at human hands today. What percentage of that suffering is a result of intentional cruelty of 
the sort condemned by the anticruelty ethic and laws? When I ask my audiences this question—whether 
scientists, agriculturalists, animal advocates, or members of the general public—I always get the same 
response: only a fraction of 1 percent. Few people have ever witnessed overt, intentional cruelty, 
which is thankfully rare. 
On the other hand, people realize that biomedical and other scientific research, toxicological safety 
testing, uses of animals in teaching, pharmaceutical product extraction from animals, and so on all 
produce far more suffering than does overt cruelty. This suffering comes from creating disease, burns, 
trauma, fractures, and the like in animals in order to study them; producing pain, fear, learned 
helplessness, aggression, and other states for research; poisoning animals to study toxicity; and 
performing surgery on animals to develop new operative procedures. In addition, suffering is 
engendered by the housing of research animals. Indeed, a prominent member of the biomedical 
research community has argued that the discomfort and suffering that animals used in research 
experience by virtue of being housed under conditions that are convenient for us, but inimical to their 
biological natures—for example, keeping rodents, which are nocturnal, burrowing creatures, in 
polycarbonate crates under artificial, full-time light—far exceed the suffering produced by invasive 
research protocols [27]. 
Now it is clear that farmers and researchers are not intentionally cruel—they are motivated by 
plausible and decent intentions: to cure disease, advance knowledge, ensure product safety, provide 
cheap and plentiful food. Nonetheless, they may inflict great amounts of suffering on the animals they 
use. Furthermore, the traditional ethic of anti-cruelty and the laws expressing it had no vocabulary for 




labeling such suffering, since researchers were not maliciously intending to hurt the animals. Indeed, 
this is eloquently marked by the fact that the cruelty laws exempt animal use in science and standard 
agricultural practices from their purview. Therefore, a new set of concepts beyond cruelty and 
kindness was needed to discuss the issues associated with burgeoning research animal use and 
industrial agriculture. 
Society eventually became aware that new kinds of suffering were engendered by modern 
agriculture. Once again, producers could not be categorized as cruel, yet they were responsible for new 
types of animal suffering on at least four fronts: 
1. Production diseases arise from the new ways the animals are produced. For example, liver 
abscesses in cattle are a function of certain animals’ responses to the high-concentrate,  
low-roughage diet that characterizes feedlot production. (That is, of course, not the only cause 
of liver abscesses.) Although a certain percentage of the animals get sick and die, the overall 
economic efficiency of feedlots is maximized by the provision of such a diet. The ideas of a 
method of production creating diseases that were “acceptable” would be anathema to a 
husbandry agriculturalist. 
2. The huge scale of industrialized agricultural operations and the small profit margin per animal 
militate against the sort of individual attention that typified much of traditional agriculture. In 
traditional dairies 50 years ago, one could make a living with a herd of 50 cows. Today, one 
needs literally thousands. In the U.S., dairies may have 10,000 cows.  
3. Another new source of suffering in industrialized agriculture results from physical and 
psychological deprivation for animals in confinement: lack of space, lack of companionship for 
social animals, inability to move freely, boredom, austerity of environments, and so on. Since 
the animals evolved for adaptation to extensive environments but are now placed in truncated 
environments, such deprivation is inevitable. This was not a problem in traditional, extensive 
agriculture. 
4. In confinement systems, workers may not be “animal smart”; the “intelligence,” such as it is, is 
in the mechanized system. Instead of husbandmen, workers in swine factories are minimum 
wage, often animal-ignorant labor. So there is often no empathy with, or concern for, the 
animals. 
These sources of suffering, like the ones in research, are again not captured by the vocabulary of 
cruelty, nor are they proscribed or even acknowledged by the laws based on the anti-cruelty ethic. 
Furthermore, they typically do not arise under traditional agriculture and its ethic of husbandry. 
A few years ago, I experienced some sharply contracting incidents which dramatically highlight the 
moral difference between intensive and extensive agriculture. That particular year, Colorado cattle 
ranchers, paradigmatic exemplars of husbandry, were afflicted by a significant amount of scours. Over 
two months, I talked to a half dozen rancher friends of mine. Every single one had experienced trouble 
with scours, and every one had spent more on treating the disease than was economically justified by 
the calves’ monetary value. When I asked these men why they were being what an economist would 
term “economically irrational,” they were quite adamant in their response: “It’s part of my bargain 
with the animal; part of caring for them,” one of them said. 




It is, of course, the same ethical outlook that leads ranch wives to sit up all night with sick marginal 
calves, sometimes for days in a row. If the issues were strictly economic, these people would hardly be 
valuing their time at 50 ¢ per hour—including their sleep time! 
Now in contrast to these uplifting moral attitudes, consider the following: One of my animal 
scientist colleagues related to me that his son-in-law was an employee in a large, total confinement 
swine operation. As a young man he had raised and shown pigs, keeping them semi-extensively. One 
day he detected a disease among the feeder pigs in the confinement facility where he works, which 
necessitated killing them with a blow to the head, since this operation did not treat individual animals, 
their profit margin being allegedly too low. Out of his long established husbandry ethic, he came in on 
his own time with his own medicine to treat the animals. He cured them! Management’s response was 
to fire him on the spot for violating company policy! He kept his job and escaped with a reprimand 
only when he was able to prove that he had expended his own—not the company’s—resources. He 
continued to work for them, but felt that his health has suffered in virtue of what I have called the 
“moral stress” he experiences every day; the stress growing out of the conflict between what he is told 
to do and how he morally believes he should be treating the animals. Eventually, he left agriculture 
altogether. The above-detailed contrasting incidents, better than anything else I know, eloquently 
illustrate the large gap between the ethics of husbandry and industry. (Many confinement operations 
are run by accountants, not by animal science or animal husbandry people.) 
Given that the old anti-cruelty ethic did not apply to animal research or confinement agriculture, 
society needed new ethical concepts to express its concern about these new uses. But ethical concepts 
do not arise ex nihilo. 
Plato taught us a very valuable lesson about effecting ethical change. If one wishes to change 
another person’s—or society’s—ethical beliefs, it is much better to remind than to teach or, in my 
martial arts metaphor, to use judo rather than sumo. In other words, if you and I disagree ethically on 
some matter, it is far better for me to show you that what I am trying to convince you of is already 
implicit—albeit unnoticed—in what you already believe. Similarly, we cannot force others to believe 
as we do (sumo); we can, however, show them that their own assumptions, if thought through, lead to 
a conclusion different from what they currently entertain (judo). These points are well-exemplified in 
20th century U.S. history. Prohibition was sumo, not judo—an attempt to forcefully impose a new 
ethic about drinking on the majority by the minority. As such, it was doomed to fail, and in fact people 
drank more during Prohibition. Contrast this with Lyndon Johnson’s civil rights legislation. As himself 
a Southerner, Johnson realized that even Southerners would acquiesce to the following two propositions: 
1. All humans should be treated equally, and black people were human—they just had never 
bothered to draw the relevant conclusion. 
2. If Johnson had been wrong about this point, if “writing this large” in the law had not 
“reminded” people, civil rights would have been as ineffective as Prohibition! 
So society was faced with the need for new moral categories and laws that reflect those categories 
in order to deal with animal use in science and agriculture and to limit the animal suffering with which 
it is increasingly concerned. At the same time, recall that western society has one through almost  
fifty years of extending its moral categories for humans to people who were morally ignored or 
invisible—women, minorities, the handicapped, children, citizens of the third world. As we noted 




earlier, new and viable ethics do not emerge ex nihilo. So a plausible and obvious move is for society 
to continue in its tendency and attempt to extend the moral machinery it has developed for dealing with 
people, appropriately modified, to animals. And this is precisely what has occurred. Society has taken 
elements of the moral categories it uses for assessing the treatment of people and is in the process of 
modifying these concepts to make them appropriate for dealing with new issues in the treatment of 
animals, especially their use in science and confinement agriculture. 
What aspect of our ethic for people is being so extended? One that is, in fact, quite applicable to 
animal use, is the fundamental problem of weighing the interests of the individual against those of the 
general welfare. Different societies have provided different answers to this problem. Totalitarian 
societies opt to devote little concern to the individual, favoring instead the state, or whatever their 
version of the general welfare may be. At the other extreme, anarchical groups such as communes give 
primacy to the individual and very little concern to the group—hence they tend to enjoy only transient 
existence. In our society, however, a balance is struck. Although most of our decisions are made to the 
benefit of the general welfare, fences are built around individuals to protect their fundamental interests 
from being sacrificed to the majority. Thus we protect individuals from being silenced even if the 
majority disapproves of what they say; we protect individuals from having their property seized 
without recompense even if such seizure benefits the general welfare; we protect individuals from 
torture even if they have planted a bomb in an elementary school and refuse to divulge its location. We 
protect those interests of the individual that we consider essential to being human, to human nature, 
from being submerged, even by the common good. Those moral/legal fences that so protect the 
individual human are called rights and are based on plausible assumptions regarding what is essential 
to being human. 
It is this notion to which society in general is looking in order to generate the new moral notions 
necessary to talk about the treatment of animals in today’s world, where cruelty is not the major 
problem but where such laudable, general human welfare goals as efficiency, productivity, knowledge, 
medical progress, and product safety are responsible for the vast majority of animal suffering. People 
in society are seeking to “build fences” around animals to protect the animals and their interests and 
natures from being totally submerged for the sake of the general welfare, and are trying to accomplish 
this goal by going to the legislature. In husbandry, this occurred automatically; in industrialized 
agriculture, where it is no longer automatic, people wish to see it legislated. 
It is necessary to stress here certain things that this ethic, in its mainstream version, is not and does 
not attempt to be. As a mainstream movement, it does not try to give human rights to animals. Since 
animals do not have the same natures and interests flowing from these natures as humans do, human 
rights do not fit animals. Animals do not have basic natures that demand speech, religion, or property; 
thus according them these rights would be absurd. On the other hand, animals have natures of their 
own and interests that flow from these natures, and the thwarting of these interests matters to animals 
as much as the thwarting of speech matters to humans. The agenda is not, for mainstream society, 
making animals have the same rights as people. It is rather preserving the common-sense insight that 
“fish gotta swim and birds gotta fly,” and suffer if they don’t. 
This new ethic is conservative, not radical, harking back to the animal use that necessitated and thus 
entailed respect for the animals’ natures. It is based on the insight that what we do to animals matters 
to them, just as what we do to humans matters to them, and that consequently we should respect that 




mattering in our treatment of use of animals as we do in our treatment and use of humans. And since 
respect for animal nature is no longer automatic as it was in traditional husbandry agriculture, society 
is demanding that it be encoded in law. Significantly, in 2004, no fewer than 2,100 bills pertaining to 
animal welfare were proposed in U.S. state legislatures. 90+ law schools now teach animal law. 
With regards to animal agriculture, the pastoral images of animals grazing on pasture and moving 
freely are iconic. As the 23rd Psalm indicates, people who consume animals wish to see the animals 
live decent lives, not lives of pain, distress and frustration. It is for this reason in part that industrial 
agriculture conceals the reality of its practices from a naïve public—witness Perdue’s advertisements 
about raising “happy chickens”, or the California “happy cow” ads. As ordinary people discover the 
truth, they are shocked. When I served on the Pew Commission and other commissioners had their first 
view of sow stalls, many were in tears and all were outraged. 
Just as our use of people is constrained by respect for the basic elements of human nature, people 
wish to see a similar notion applied to animals. Animals, too, have natures, what I call telos following 
Aristotle—the “pigness of the pig”, the “cowness of a cow”. Pigs are “designed” to move about on soft 
loam, not to be in gestation crates. If this no longer occurs naturally, as it did in husbandry, people 
wish to see it legislated. This is the mainstream sense of “animal rights”. 
As property, strictly speaking, animals cannot have legal rights. But a functional equivalent to rights 
can be achieved by limiting human property rights. When I and others drafted the U.S. federal laws for 
laboratory animals, we did not deny that research animals were the property of researchers. We merely 
placed limits on their use of their property. I may own my car, but that does not mean I can drive it on 
the sidewalk or at any speed I choose. Similarly, our law states that if one hurts an animal in research, 
one must control pain and distress. Thus research animals can be said to have the right to have their 
pain controlled. [27] 
In the case of farm animals, people wish to see their basic needs and nature, teloi, respected in the 
systems that they are raised. Since this no longer occurs naturally as it did in husbandry, it must be 
imposed by legislation or regulation. A Gallup poll conducted in 2003 shows that 75% of the public 
wants legislated guarantees of farm animal welfare [28]. This is what I call “animal rights as a 
mainstream phenomenon”. Legal codification of rules of animal care respecting animal telos is thus the 
form animal welfare takes where husbandry has been abandoned. 
Thus, in today’s world, the ethical component of animal welfare prescribes that the way we raise 
and use animals must embody respect and provision for their psychological needs and natures. It is 
therefore essential that industrial agriculture phase out those systems which cause animal suffering by 
violating animals’ natures and replace them with systems respecting their natures. 
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